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ABSTRACT
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are an integration of computing and physical
processes. Information flow is an inherent property of CPSs and is of particular interest at
their cyber-physical boundaries. This thesis focuses on discovering information flow
properties and proposes a process to model the information flow in CPSs. A Cooperating
FACTS Power System serves as a tangible example to illustrate modeling information
flow using the proposed process. The proposed process can be used to model the
information flow security, help analyze current information flow security requirements,
and aid in the design of further security policies in a CPS.
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NOMENCLATURE
Symbol

Description

ES

Event System

NF

Noninference security property

ND

Nondeducible security property

BNDC

Bisimulation-based Non Deducibility on Composition security property

Tr

System event traces

1. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of computation with physical
processes. Embedded computers and networks monitor and control the physical processes,
usually with feedback loops, where physical processes affect computations and vice versa
[18]. In the physical world, the events occur in real-time so discrete event clocks cannot
be stopped to create a consistent state and concurrency is intrinsic. However, computing
and networking technologies currently do not take those into consideration well. CPS
applications include high confidence medical devices and systems, traffic control and
safety, advanced automotive systems, process control, energy conservation,
environmental control, avionics, instrumentation and critical infrastructure control
systems (such as electric power, water resources, and communications systems). Besides
inherited physical interactions and their concurrent computation nature, CPSs are usually
network-centric systems [25].
Various issues in the study of CPSs need to be addressed. This thesis focuses on
the security aspect of the CPS. Among the various security issues dealing with
confidentiality, integrity and availability, this thesis focuses on the confidentiality of
CPSs, especially on information flow security. The physical nature of a CPS tends to
expose information flow through actions at the cyber-physical boundary.
Many CPSs consist of similar elements. In the Cooperating FACTS Power
System (CFPS), an intelligent controller communicates with other intelligent controllers
and makes decisions via distributed decision making. In the CFPS, an intelligent
controller sits on lines of an electric power system to balance the power flow of the entire
power system. Throughout this thesis the CFPS is used as the example to identify and
model the information flow in a CPS. The CFPS serves as a real world example to show
the applicability of the proposed process.
The family of Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices are power
electronic-based controllers that can rapidly inject or absorb active and reactive power,
thereby affecting power flow across transmission lines; a FACTS device changes the
amount of power owing on a particular power line. The use of FACTS devices in a power
system can potentially overcome limitations of the present manually/mechanically
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controlled transmission system [3]. A FACTS Device (depicted in Figure 1.1) consists of
an embedded computer that depends on a low voltage control system for signal
processing, which, in turn, depends on a low and a high voltage power conversion system
for rapidly switching power into the power line. Each FACTS device controls one power
line (ControlledLine) and multiple FACTS devices interact with each other via
exchanging messages over a network (Communication). The net effect of the FACTS
devices and the power grid is that each power line and FACTS device is affected by other
power lines and FACTS devices.

Figure 1.1 A FACTS device

The Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC) device is a type of FACTS device
[3][28] that can modify active power flow on a power line. In this thesis, the FACTS
devices refer to the UPFC devices.
FACTS devices are primarily used when a cascading failure occurs within a
Power System; one or more lines are lost due to a downed line or overloaded line and the
resulting redirected power flow stresses the network. Too much power may flow over

3
lines of inadequate capacity and one-by-one the lines overload and trip out until a large
portion of the Power System has failed [3]. FACTS device coordination is required to
prevent cascading failures [1][3]. The FACTS devices themselves communicate over an
interconnected computing network to reach agreement on how power should be routed or
re-routed in the presence of a contingency. These Cooperating FACTS Devices (CFD)
working together in the electric power network form the CFPS [28]. The FACTS devices
behave autonomously, but they depend on information received from their participation
in the CFPS to determine their responses. The CFPS uses a distributed maxflow
algorithm [1] to rebalance power flow, which is done in the Long Term Control (LTC),
running on different processors that are located in different UPFC devices to compute the
decision and manipulate the power network by sending the power settings to Dynamic
Control. The Dynamic Control then sets the Power Electronics to enforce the local power
flow to an expected value which redistributes power flow at a regional or wider level
within the power network. The LTC and Dynamic Control both sit in the Embedded PC
as a portion of a FACTS device (shown in Figure 1.1). Each FACTS device must
continually monitor not only its own behavior in response to system operating changes,
but the response of neighboring devices as well.
Distributed computing management is different from a traditional centralized
power network management system; the CFD manipulates the whole CFPS in a
decentralized way, so that new security issues emerge. In [28], a broad investigation into
the operational and security challenges that the CFDs face has been discussed. A general
security analysis of FACTS has been given in the report which includes vulnerability of
CFD and some available good practices based on those used for SCADA systems. An
agent-based security framework has been suggested, while multiple levels of FACTS
devices security issues and the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the electric
power grid have been briefly analyzed. However, no approach has been proposed nor any
concrete example described in the confidentiality of CFPS.
The North American Electric Regulatory Corporation (NERC) provides a basis to
define permanent cyber security standards [34]. These provide a cyber security
framework to identify and assist with the protection of Critical Cyber Assets to ensure
reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. Those requirements, stated in Standard
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CIP-002-1 to CIP-009-1, address various security issues and require approaches to
provide security in the Bulk Power System.
This thesis identifies the vulnerability of information flow in a CPS from
analyzing the example system's execution sequence. After analyzing the potential
information flow of the CPS, a process is proposed to model the information flow
security to provide secure computing in the CPS. Finally, automatic checking tools are
applied to check system behavior against the developed security property to prove the
system's security.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 INFORMATION FLOW SECURITY
A security model is used to describe any formal statement of a system's
confidentiality, integrity and availability requirements [23]. Using information flow,
principals can infer properties of objects from observing system behavior [32]. This is a
potential hazard in the cyber-physical world so it requires more attention. To be more
specific, inferring confidential information from the observable information flow is a
potential source of critical information leakage; the information flow of CFPS needs to be
carefully analyzed. Various security models that analyze multi-level security system
behavior from the access control or execution sequence perspective have been discussed
for decades to address the information flow problems of a system in the defense
community. However, most of the related publications [21] [22] [23] [24] [27] have not
been directly applied to CPSs. One of the reasons security models are less popular
outside the defense area is due to the complexity. Considering the significance of the
confidential information in critical infrastructure, it is worth introducing these models to
address the information flow in the security analysis of critical infrastructure. Figure 2.1
shows a partial taxonomy of the security models discussed in [24]. Those models in grey
have been used in this work to analyze the security of CFPS.

Figure 2.1 Partial taxonomy of the security models in [24]
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Before defining the security models that has been used throughout this thesis,
Table 2.1 is a list of convention:

Table 2.1 Convention used in formal description throughout this thesis
Symbol Meaning
Tr

System traces

τ

A system trace

\x

System purge all traces in the domain of x

E1 | E 2

Parallel composition of event E1 and E 2

H

High-level security domain

L

Low-level security domain

I

Inputs

O

Outputs

2.1.1 Noninference Model. A system is considered secure if and only if for any

legal trace of system events, the trace results from the legal trace purged of all high-level
events is still a legal trace of the system [23][24][27].
NF ( ES ) ≡ ∀τ ∈ Tr : τ \ h ∈ Tr

(1)

Here, in order to make the security property easier to understand, an imaginary problem
modeled after delivering pizzas to the Pentagon is constructed, the Pentagon-pizza shop
example. There is a high-level set of events (experts arrive) that are supposed to be secret
and a set of low-level events in which a pizza shop cooks and the Pentagon disposes of
pizza. The events are depicted in Figure 2.2. The notation of system events are borrowed
from [21]. A solid line refers to a low-level event and a dotted line refers to the high-level
event.
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Figure 2.2 Pentagon-pizza shop example for noninference security property

Shown in Figure 2.2 are two systems, namely the Pentagon and the pizza shop.
Each one has legal (allowed) sequences as follows:
Pentagon : {Expert _ Come | Out _ to _ eat | Order _ n _ pizza | Trash _ n _ pizza,
Order _ n _ pizza | Trash _ n _ pizza}
Pizza _ shop : {Come _ to _ eat | deliver _ n _ pizza | cook _ n + m _ pizza,
deliver _ n _ pizza | cook _ n + m _ pizza}
If only consider the Pentagon system, the high-level events are Expert come and
the number of the people who go out _ to _ eat , the low-level events are
Order _ n _ pizza and Trash _ n _ pizza . From a more substantiative point of view, if the

Pentagon trashes regular numbers of pizza boxes everyday, these low-level events happen
no matter what the high-level events are and the observers will not be able to infer if
there are any high-level events (like any experts coming to Pentagon who require
ordering pizza). If a system shares the same property as this Pentagon system, it satisfies
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the noninference security property as described in (1). The pizza shop is another example
that satisfies the noninference security property for the same reason that purging the highlevel events leaves the low-level (observable) events unchanged.
2.1.2 Nondeducible Model. A system is considered nondeducible secure if it is

impossible for a low-level user, through observing visible events, to deduce anything
about the sequence of inputs made by a high-level user. In other words, system is
nondeducible secure if the low-level observation is compatible with any of the high-level
inputs. [21][23][24]
ND( ES ) ≡ ∀τ L ,τ H ∈ Tr : ∃τ ∈ Tr : τ \ h = ∀τ L ∩ τ |H ∩ I

(2)

The Pentagon-pizza shop example is also used here (shown in Figure 2.3) to illustrate the
nonduducible security property. In this figure, the possibility that the composed system
doesn't satisfy the nondeducible property is illustrated as well.
In Figure 2.3, Pentagon and Pizza shop are still used as the systems to illustrate
the nondeducible security property. Each of the system has legal (allowed) sequence as
following:
Pentagon : {Expert _ Come | Out _ to _ eat | Order _ lunch | Even # ,
Out _ to _ eat | Order _ lunch | Odd # }
Pizza _ shop : {Come _ to _ eat | Cook _ lunch | Odd # ,
Cook _ lunch | Even # }
If the Pentagon system is considered in isolation from the low-level observation,
the observer should not be able to infer Even# and Odd# are introduced by either 0,1 or
more Expert come events. Any system sharing the same property as the Pentagon system,
in which the low-level observation is compatible with any of the high-level inputs,
satisfies the nondeducible security property defined in (2). However, the composability of
the nondeducible security property needs to be pointed out as shown on the right side of
Figure 2.3. Although the Pentagon system and the pizza shop system satisfy the
nondeducible security property individually, when composed together, the composed
system no longer satisfy the nondeducible security property since, when the observer
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observes Even# from one side and Odd# from the other side, s/he will infer that there
must be some high-level event(s) that caused the difference.

Figure 2.3 Pentagon-pizza shop example for nondeducible security property

2.1.3 Bisimulation-based Nondeducibility on Composition Model. A system

is considered to have the Bisimulation-based Non-Deducibility on Composition (BNDC)
property, if it can preserve its security after composition. [6][8] A system ES is BNDC if
for every high-level process P , a low-level user cannot distinguish ES from

( ES | P ) \ Act H ( ES composed with any other process P and purged high-level events).
In other words, a system ES is BNDC if what a low-level user sees of the system is not
modified by composing any high-level process P to ES .
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Formally BNDC can be defined as: ES is BNDC if and only if

BNDC ( ES ) ≡ ∀Π ∈ Ε H , ES / τ H ≈ B ( ES / Π ) \ τ H

(3)

Note: here ES / τ H means turn all the high-level events in ES to internal events. BNDC
can be illustrated with a very similar Pentagon-pizza shop example as in Figure 2.3 by
adding an internal event that leads to a high-level output. In this case, the system can be
composed with any other system but from the observation point of view (bisimulation),
the system satisfies the BNDC property.
2.1.4 Bell-LaPadula Model. Different from those security models mentioned

above, the Bell-LaPadula model is an access control model which offers more tangible
security rules that can be enforced during execution. In the Bell-LaPadula model [2], all
entities are divided into subjects and objects. Subjects are active entities, while objects
are passive containers for information. The Bell-LaPadula model sets up rules for
untrusted subjects:
Untrusted subjects may only read from objects of lower or equal security level
Untrusted process may only write to objects of greater or equal security level
2.1.5 Applicability. The CFPS system fits within the multi-level security

structure. To analyze the information flow of CFPS more effectively, the security models
defined above are used. The noninference property might be too strong in some systems
where the low-level inputs result in high-level outputs. However, the noninference model
can be applied in this information flow analysis for the principle components of UPFC
devices because no low-level input results in high-level outputs in the systems being
analyzed. The nondeducible security property is used to analyze the system where highlevel outputs are observable. According to [21], if an entire system is nondeducible
secure, then no low-level user of that system will ever learn any high-level information
through the system. The BNDC security model has the advantage that if systems satisfy
the BNDC property, they are composable. Furthermore, the BNDC is compatible with
noninference and nondeducible security properties. The Bell-LaPadula model is used to
illustrate how vulnerabilities are introduced in other perspectives besides the interface
models.
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2.2 SECURITY PROCESS ALGEBRA (SPA) AND PERSISTENT SECURITY
PROPERTY CHECKING TOOL – COPS

In order to formalize the security models described in last section, this thesis uses
security process algebra (SPA) to formalize the behavior of the system and uses CoPS as
an automatic tool to check the system's security property against security properties that
can be checked by CoPS.
2.2.1 SPA. Security Process Algebra (SPA, for short) is an extension of Calculus

of Communicating Systems (CCS) [26] - a language proposed to specify concurrent
systems, that defines algebra consisting of operators for building systems using a bottomup approach from smaller subsystems. The basic building blocks are atomic activities,
called actions; unlike CCS, in SPA, actions belong to two different levels of
confidentiality, thus allowing the specification of multilevel (actually, two-level) systems.
The BNF Syntax of SPA to describe the system is [9]:
E ::= 0 | µ .E | E1 + E 2 | E1 | E 2 | E \ L | E \ I L | E / L | E[ f ] | Z
where 0 is the empty process, which cannot do any action; µ.E can do action µ and then
behaves like E ; E1 + E 2 can alternatively choose to behave like E1 or E 2 ; E1 | E 2 is the

parallel composition of E1 and E 2 , where the executions of the two systems are
interleaved, E \ L can execute all the actions E is able to do, provided that they do not
belong to L ∪ L ; E \ I L requires that the actions of E do not belong to L ∩ I ; E / L
turns all the actions in L into internal τ 's; if E can execute action µ , then E[ f ]
performs f ( µ ) ; finally, Z does what E does, if Z def E .
As an example of using SPA, consider an imaginary system, ES, that leaks
information from a high-level security entity to the low-level. ES has no constraints on
read or write (output or input) sequences; the system behavior can be described as:
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ES = Action | Object ( high, y ) | Object (low, y ) \ N ;
Action = read (l , x ).val ( z ) + write(l , y ).W ( y, z ) \ N
Object ( x, y ) = R ( x, y ).Object (0, init ) + W ( x, y ).Object ( x, y )
where N is the event set that ES does not allow. In the above description: Object refer to
any security entities and it has parameter l which could be high or low to indicate the
security level of object and parameter y to indicate the current status of y (in this example,
a value is used to indicate the current state). read and write refer to the action that this
system allowed. R and W refer to the real final output of reading result or the input of
writing result.
Here is one possible sequence that leaked the information:

( Action | Object (0,0) | Object (1,5) \ N
read ( 0,1)


→( read (0,1). R (1,5) | Action \ N
write ( 0,1)

→( write(0,0).W (0,5) | Action ) \ N

τ

→
(Object (0,5) | Object (1,5) | Action ) \ N
read ( 0, 0 )

→( R (0,0).Val (0,5) | Action ) \ N

This sequence can be interpreted as: a low level ( l = 0 ) object read the high level ( l = 1 )
object and get its status ( y = 5 ) and write it to itself ( l = 0, y = 0 → 5 ) , later any low
level object can read this low level object and get the status ( y = 5 ) which leaks the
information.
2.2.2 CoPS. CoPS is an automatic checker of multilevel system's security

properties [20]. In particular, CoPS checks the three security properties: Bisimulationbased Non-Deducibility on Composition (BNDC), Strong Bisimulation-based NonDeducibility on Composition (SBNDC) and, Persistent BNDC (P BNDC) [6] [7] [8].
These are Non-Interference properties [24] which imply the Bisimulation-based NonDeducibility on Composition [6] [8]. In this case, the CoPS is chosen to check the
modeled behavior of CFPS to see if it satisfies the BNDC which is compatible with the
noninference and nondeducible security properties.
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The SPA discussed in the last section can be converted to code that is compatible
with CoPS syntax and checked automatically by CoPS against security properties that
reorganized in CoPS. The conversion takes several steps as:
CoPS has keywords as shown in Table 2.2.

Keyword

Table 2.2 Keywords defined by CoPS
Meaning

bi

Bind (agent) identifier

basi

Bind action set identifier

acth

Bind an action set to Act_H, the high level actions

Identify security objects (defined as agent in CoPS using keyword bi)
Identify objects' actions (defined as action set in CoPS using keyword basi)
Classify security levels to each action and clarify high-level actions (defined as
high-level actions in CoPS using keyword acth)
Rewrite the system behavior with above identified items
In order to illustrate the syntax of CoPS the small imaginary system used in the
last section is written into code that CoPS can interpret as following:

bi ES
(Action |Obj_l0 | Obj_h5)\L
bi Action
read_ll.rl0.'val_l0.Behavior +
read_hh.rh5.'val_h5.Behavior +
read_lh.rl5.'val_h5.Behavior +
read_hl.rl0.'val_l0.Behavior +
write_ll.'wl0.Behavior +
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write_lh.'wh0.Behavior +
write_hl.'wl5.Behavior +
write_hh.'wh5.Behavior
bi Obj_l0
'rl0.Obj_l0 + wl0.Obj_l0 + wl0.Obj_l5
bi Obj_l5
'rl5.Obj_l5 + wl5.Obj_l0 + wl5.Obj_l5
bi Obj_h0
'rh0.Obj_h0 + wh0.Obj_h0 + wh0.Obj_h5
bi Obj_h5
'rh5.Obj_h5 + wh5.Obj_h0 + wh1.Obj_h5
basi L
rh0 rh5 rl0 rl5
wh0 wh5 wl0 wl5
basi N
val_h0 val_h5
val_l0 val_l5
read_hh read_hl read_lh read_ll
write_hh write_hl write_lh write_ll

acth
val_h0 val_h5
rh0 rh5 wh0 wh5 read_hh
write_hh write_hl
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With the above code, the CoPS checks the behavior of the described system and
finds it does not satisfy any recognized security properties, such as the BNDC. This is the
same as the result in last section.
In the remainder of this thesis, information flow in CPSs will be discovered by
using the SPA discussed to model system behavior and codes are written to check system
behavior against security properties that are defined in CoPS. The later analysis of
information flow problems resulting from system behavior is very similar to the small
example discussed in this chapter.
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3. INFORMATION FLOWS IN CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are integrations of computation with physical
processes. The embedded computers and networks used to monitor and control the
physical processes, usually include feedback loops where physical processes affect
computations and vice versa[5]. The cyber and physical interactions have the potential to
leak information from the system to the outside world. In this section, the CFPS is used
as an example to illustrate possible information flow in a CPS.
Lack of confidentiality of information flow can have catastrophic effects. As an
example, consider an instance of the IEEE 118 bus system [3][19]. This is a highly
stressed system with many lines near overload. There are critical lines that, if removed,
will cause cascading failures throughout the system. From the analysis in [3][19], if line
4-5 is removed, line 5-11 will be overloaded and be tripped later, then line 7-12 will be
overloaded and tripped, then other lines will be overloaded and lead to a cascading failure.
If attackers know these critical lines together with a good guess of line capacity, they can
carry out an effective attack causes a cascading failure of the system simply by physically
removing a critical line. The confidential information leaked by information flow will
assist or accelerate the attackers.
3.1 DEFINING INFORMATION FLOW IN CFPS

In the CFPS, decisions are made cooperatively and distributively. The decisionmaking information is what needs to be kept confidential. The internal settings and
control operations of a single FACTS device or the CFDs are defined as confidential in
[28]. Current work follows their definition of confidential information (as shown in Table
3.1, adapted from Table 2 in [28]) to analyze the information flow in the CFPS.
The CFPS is made up of 3 security levels (shown in Table 3.2). In the high-level
domain, communication is done by the Long Term Control. In the medium-level domain,
the Dynamic Control and Power Electronics have implicit communication with other
FACTS devices. At the low-level security domain, the settings of the power line cause
implicit communication in the power network. The implicit communication is done when
the power setting of ControlledLine(s) is changed and the whole system's power flow
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redistributes correspondingly as shown in Figure 3.1. This kind of communication is due
to the interconnected nature of power networks. Failure of confidentiality in the system is
defined as leakage of higher level (including the high-level and medium-level security
domain) information, such as internal settings and control operations, to the low-level
security domain.

Data

Table 3.1 Confidential information in CFPS
Type
Source
Function

Dynamic

Digital

Control

Dynamic

Obtain

and

pass

computed

Control

changes to prevent oscillations

Feedback
Data Exchange Analog
with

and Neighbor Data

CFD Digital (Ethernet) CFD

necessary to

implement

distributed max flow algorithm

neighbors
Control

Type

Source

Control

Digital

Neighbor Information

Exchange with (Ethernet)
CFD neighbors

Security

CFD

Function

necessary

for

cooperative agreement on CFD
changes

Table 3.2 Security levels in Cooperating FACTS Power System
Security entities
Reason

High-level

Long Term Control

Contains critical information for distributed

Parameters of CFPS

control algorithm and calculated settings with
a global view of the power grid

Medium-

Dynamic Control

Contains settings received from high-level

level

DSP board

security entity and will generate local settings

Power Electronics

according to local control algorithms

ControlledLine

Open access to some power lines or easy to

Local power network

obtain knowledge of part of the power grid

Low-level
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Figure 3.1 Architecture of CFPS

In order to demonstrate the information flow clearly, following assumptions are
made:
Assumption 1: The message send by LTC is legitimate and correct. (The security of

LTC itself is not taken into consideration in current work.)
Assumption 2: The communication network which the LTCs used to pass the maxflow

algorithm messages is secure. In other words, the communication between LTCs located
in different UPFC devices is considered to be secure.
Assumption 3: The power flow information of entire power network is secure, although

some single power lines can be measured or a local topology is observable.
Assumptions 1 and 2 define the problem scope of this paper, which is confined to
investigate the security of system information flow but not other security issues such as
active attacks including maliciously changing the settings. Assumption 3 is made to
analyze the system's information flow with the basic information that the possible
attackers could find.
3.2 FINDING THE INFORMATION FLOW IN CFPS

A bottom-up approach is used to find and analyze the information flow of CFPS.
The CFPS is decomposed to the level of single components which are used to aggregate
the UPFC device. The information flow is analyzed at the component level first, then
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those components are composed to build UPFC device. The information flow at the
UPFC device level is further investigated to reflect the security of the system.
3.2.1 Information Flow of the Components in the UPFC. The principal

components of a UPFC device which include the LTC, Dynamic Control, DSP board and
Power Electronics are depicted in Figure 1.1. The information flow of a UPFC device is
shown in Figure 3.2, where each component is considered a security entity. Figure 3.3
illustrates the information flow of the principle components building a UPFC device
using the pictorial notation for the traces as introduced in [21]. Here, horizontal vectors
represent inputs to and outputs from the system. The broken line represents the higher
level events and the solid line represents the low-level events.

Figure 3.2 Information flow diagram of UPFC devices

A series of lemmas regarding the components of the UPFC device are proved as
following. These are used to prove the property of noninference and other security
properties of the composed system in later theorems.
3.2.1.1 DSP board.

Lemma 1, the DSP operation is noninference secure.

Proof: Seen from Figure 3.3, the DSP board is a non-deterministic system which is built
up from traces of the following form:{{},e1,e3,e4,e1e2,e1e3,e1e4,e3e4, e1e2e3,
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e1e2e4,e1e3e4,e1e2e3e4, …}(… stands for any interleavings of listed traces in the system),
where e1 is a Low-level Input (LI) event; e2 is a High-level Output (HO) event; e3 is a
High-level Input (HI) event and e4 is a HO event. This system satisfies the definition of
noninference [24][25][27] because purging any legal trace of events not in low-level
security domain, the result will either be e1 or {} which are both legal traces of the
system, i.e., DSP Board system itself is a noninference secure system where no
information flows from the high level security domain interfere with (the interference
used in this paper refer to the events from other domain than the observer belongs to, that
can be observed by the observer) the low level security domain.
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Figure 3.3 Information flow of principle components of UPFC

3.2.1.2 Dynamic Control.

noninference secure.

Lemma 2, the Dynamic Control operation is
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Proof: the Dynamic Control system is a non-deterministic system, shown in Figure 3.3(b),
that contains traces of the following form: {{},e1,e2,e1e3,e1e2,e2e3,e1e2e3, …}, where e1 is
a LI event, e2 is a HI event and e3 is a HO event. When project any legal trace to the lowlevel security domain or purge any events that not in the low level security domain, the
result will be either e1 or {}, which are also legal traces. Therefore, the Dynamic Control
system satisfies the noninference security model.
3.2.1.3 Long Term Control (LTC). The LTC system, which is a non-

deterministic system shown in Figure 3.3(c), where all the events are high-level events.
It's obvious that there is no interference between high-level security domain and the
lower level security domain in LTC system. In other words, there is no information flow
out of the high-level security domain. Proving this in the perspective of information flow
is trivial.
3.2.1.4 Power Electronics.

Lemma 3, the Power Electronics operation is not

noninference secure.
Proof: the Power Electronics event system, shown in Figure 3.3(d), simply contains
traces: {{}, e1, e1e2, …}. When project any legal traces to the low-level security domain,
the result will be either e2 or {}, where e2 is not a legal trace in this system. i.e., the power
electronics system is not noninference secure. In this system e1(HI) infers e2(LO), which
means if e2 happens e2 must happen before.
The causal relationship between e1 and e2 is where the information has been
downgraded and passed to the lower security domain. This system is not secure not only
in the perspective of interface models, but also in the view of access control models such
as the Bell-LaPadula model [2] since there is information classified as higher level has
been written to the low level domain, which violates the second rule of the Bell-LaPadula
model.
3.2.2 Information Flow of the Composition of Components into the UPFC.

The UPFC device is able to work only when all the components mentioned above
compose together and work properly. In this section, the composed UPFC devices will be
discussed with and without considering the internal events respectively. After the
components are composed to form the UPFC device, the information flows between
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components inside UPFC device are internal information flows (shown in Figure 3.4) and
others are externals (shown in Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.4 Information flow analysis at UPFC device level – internal and external flow

Figure 3.5 Information flow analysis at UPFC device level – external flow only

Theorem 1, Considering the external events only, the composition of DSP, Dynamic

Control, LTC and Power electronics forming the UPFC device is noninference secure.
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Proof: From Lemma 1, 2, the DSP and Dynamic Control are noninference secure.
Connecting DSP and the Dynamic Control with the LTC, it is still noninference secure.
The result of Lemma 3 does not invalidate the noninference secure property of these
components composed with power electronics. Observing Figure 3.5 and taking the
UPFC device without considering the internal events, it is a non-deterministic system that
contains traces {{},e1,e3,e5, e1e3, e1e5,e3e5,e1e3e5, …}(The composed system's boundary is
at UPFC device as shown in Figure 3.5). The projection of these external events traces
for the UPFC device to the low-level domain is either {} or e3 which are legal traces (the
only observable low-level event – the sensor reading event can happen without the
occurrence of any higher level events). That means the UPFC device, considering only
the external events, is a noninference secure system. The UPFC device is noninference
secure so that attackers cannot infer the higher level behavior simply from observing lowlevel events.
This noninference secure property proved in Theorem 1 is achieved without
observation of power flow, in other words, the system boundary under consideration is
the UPFC device itself but not the ControlledLine linked to the UPFC device. Since the
attacker usually will not be able to attack the UPFC device itself due to the physical
protection such as those required by CIP-006-1, the system boundary can stop at the
ControlledLine. Usually the ControlledLine is more prone to be attacked due to its
physical nature of open access.
Theorem 2, the system constructed of the UPFC device connected with the

ControlledLine is nondeducible secure.
Proof: Observing the event system at ControlledLine from Figure 3.4, the system
contains traces {{}, e1e4, e2e4, e1e2e4, …}, where e4 is LO event, both e1 and e2 are HI
events. This system is not noninference secure because the projection of the legal trace to
the low level domain ({e4}) is not a legal trace. However, the system with the boundary
at the ControlledLine satisfies nondeducible security property [24][25][27], because
every high level input (either e1, e2 or both e1 and e2) are compatible with the low level
output (e4).
As shown in Figure 3.4, the changes of ControlledLine can be affected by the
local settings from Dynamic Control or by the other LTC settings that propagate through
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the power network. Even more, it could be affected by the topology change of power
lines (such as a line trip), which triggers the redistribution of the power flow for the
system. That is to say, by only observing the events interfering with the ControlledLine,
no clue of where the information is from can be formed.
That the UPFC device (with the boundary at ControlledLine) satisfies the
nondeducible security model seems to be a very favorable result, even during building the
UPFC devices, a component which is not secure (as from Lemma 3 where the Power
Electronics downgrades the information to a low-level domain), the system is still secure
considering the external information flow interference. From the interface model point of
view, the system is secure such that no confidential information is exposed through
information flow. In the real system, however, the ControlledLine is observable, and this
introduces a new vulnerability.
3.2.3 Information Flow at the Cyber-Physical Boundary. Given the results of

previous sections, is this system really secure considering other types of inference? By
measuring power flow in or out of the UPFC device, can the high-level actions be
deduced? Due to the nature of the electric power network, its physical infrastructures are
exposed outside and prone to be attacked easily. Taking the UPFC device as an example
and considering only passive attacks such as attaching meters to measure the line voltage
and current parameters, it is possible that these measured data could help to calculate the
settings from the control devices of the Power System and infer the control operation
accordingly. With a passive attack of using meters attached to the ControlledLine and
with a reasonable amount of computation the "settings" of UPFC devices can be
calculated with the computation model shown in Figure 3.6.

V1∠θ1

V2∠θ 2
FACTS
R + jX

Vt ∠θ t

V1∠θ1

Vinj

V2∠θ 2

R + jX

Figure 3.6 Computation model of ControlledLine and the FACTS devices
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Theorem 3, the UPFC settings can be deduced by computation with the low-level

observation.
Proof: In Figure 3.6, if take two measurement of three-phase instantaneous voltage and
current information at both sides of the UPFC device ( Vt ∠θ t and V2 ∠θ 2 ), using
Kirchhoff's law, the injected voltage

Vinj

can be solved. The settings of UPFC from the

Dynamic Control can be further calculated if

Vinj

is known. This means the local settings

can be observed (compromised) even with the information flow analysis that has been
done in previous paragraphs.
In summary, the selected CPS has information flow out of the system at the
cyber-physical boundary. A proper way to catch and model this information flow needs
to be addressed. In next section, a process to model the information flow in a CPS is
proposed. The CFPS is used as example to illustrate the process.
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4. PROPOSED PROCESS TO MODEL CPS'S INFORMATION FLOW
4.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

As expressed in the last section, the can be leaked to the outside through cyberphysical interactions. A process is proposed to model the information flow of a CPS.
The process of modeling information flow includes early steps of (1) eliciting
security requirements by the misuse case and identifying nonfunctional requirements that
tightly couple with the security requirements, (2) intermediate steps such as applying
security models and modifying the models to suit the particular system, and (3) final
steps of formally describing the system and checking system behavior against security
properties. The entire process for modeling the information flow in a large system is
shown in Figure 4.1. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to propose a feasible and effective
process that can serve as a baseline to model the information flow security of a large CPS.
To illustrate the process and show its suitability for CPS, the CFPS continues to
serve as the example. In the following sections, each step in this process is explained first
in general, then corresponding work is done with the CFPS.

Figure 4.1 Process of modeling information flow security in Cyber-Physical System
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4.2 STEPS OF THE INFORMATION FLOW MODELING PROCESS AND
EXAMPLE OF CFPS

The process of modeling information flow security includes the following steps:
security requirements elicit the misuse case, specify other non-functional requirements
that have the potential to couple with the security requirements, analyze the elicited
requirements using available security models and SPA, extend or modify the security
model to adapt to the security of information flow; apply automatic checking.
4.2.1 Requirement Elicitation. Misuse case is used to elicit the requirement for

securities as the first step of modeling the information flow of Cyber-Physical System.
4.2.1.1 Misuse case. A misuse case is the inverse of a use case [11][12][13]

i.e., a function that the system should not allow. A use case is defined as a completed
sequence of actions which gives increased value to the user. One could define a misuse
case as a completed sequence of actions which results in loss for the organization or some
speci_c stakeholder. A mis-actor is parallel to an actor, i.e., an actor who does not want
the system to function, an actor who initiates misuse cases.
4.2.1.2 Misuse case of CFPS system. As mentioned, the misuse case can be

used to describe the system's undesired behavior. Figure 4.2 is a diagram that uses the
concept of misuse case and mis-actor to illustrate the information flow of the FACTS
system. A current misuse case is shown in Figure 4.2, developed from group discussions
by the Power Research Group at the University of Missouri, Rolla. However, other
techniques, such as attack trees, can also be used to aid the generation of misuse cases to
a system.
From Figure 4.2, it can be found that the use cases in the rectangle with the
broken line are fundamental to both passive and active attackers. From Table 4.1 to Table
4.3, the same conclusion can be drawn namely, that the integrity and availability of the
system is not independent of the confidentiality. Current work focuses on the
confidentiality of the system. As shown in Table 4.1, SR 1.1.1, SR 1.2.1 and SR 1.3.1,
physical protection to the device and the medium, needs to be applied. This thesis focuses
only on the security requirement of the information flow of this system, which is mostly
concerned with confidentiality (in Table 4.1).
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Figure 4.2 Misuse case of Flexible AC Transmission System

With the misuse case shown in Figure 4.2, some security requirements are elicited
by considering the unveiled possible attacks, as shown in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.

Table 4.1 Requirements for integrity
Security Requirements (Integrity): SR 2.1: The LTC's settings can not be changed
SR 2.2: The dynamic control(DCtrl)'s settings can not be changed
SR 2.3: The power electronics (PE)'s settings are confidential

Table 4.2 Some requirements for availability
Security Requirements (Availability): SR 3.1: Critical devices need physical protection and hardware backup
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Table 4.3 Requirements for confidentiality
Security Requirements (Confidential): SR 1.1: The LTC's settings are confidential
SR 1.1.1: Physical protection to LTC and the media that the settings are sent through
SR 1.1.2: The LTC's control settings are confidential
SR 1.1.3: The LTC's control operation are confidential
SR 1.2: The dynamic control (DCtrl)'s settings are confidential
SR 1.2.1: Physical protection to DCtrl and the media that the settings are sent
through
SR 1.2.2: The DCtrl's control settings are confidential
SR 1.2.3: The DCtrl's control operation are confidential
SR 1.3: The power electronics (PE)'s settings are confidential
SR 1.3.1: Physical protection to PE and the media that the settings are sent through
SR 1.3.2: The PE's control settings are confidential
SR 1.3.3: The PE's control operation are confidential
SR 1.4: No weak operation point of system can be deduced

4.2.2 Identify the Functional and Non-functional Requirements Behind the
Misuse Cases. Identify the functional and non-functional requirements that couple with

the current security requirement is important to achieve a complete specification of the
security requirement. Table 4.4 shows a sample of the timing requirements of the CFPS.
The system's information flow security cannot be achieved without other functional and
non-functional requirements working properly.
The current process of finding the coupling of functional and nonfunctional
requirements with the security requirement is by excluding those requirements that are
not related to the security requirements. In practice, any requirement that affects the same
system parameters or system states will be considered as coupling with the security
requirements that have been identified. This is not an effective strategy, as it covers many
functional and nonfunctional requirements. However, it is worthy in the design and
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analysis phase of the critical infrastructure. The strategy of purging the non-security
related requirements can be changed and investigated in the future.

Requirements: -

Table 4.4 Sample of nonfunctional requirements[28][35]

…
Real time constrains:
R x.1 The LTC's update rate of 10s
R x.2 The dynamic control (DCtrl)'s update rate is 1ms
R x.3 The power electronics (PE)'s update rate is 0.33s (300Hz)
R.x.4 The load change rate is 20ms (50Hz)
…

4.2.3 Security Analysis Using Available Security Models. Figure 4.3 shows the

interaction between the FACTS device and the power system. Currently, the power
system is modeled and represented by a simulation engine, which simulates an IEEE 118
bus power system. Attackers are also shown in Figure 4.3. However, only the passive
attackers have been considered in modeling the system information flow security. In
Figure 4.3 both the FACTS device and the Simulation Engine are high-level objects.
However, the ControlledLine(s) are considered to be low-level objects due to their open
physical nature.
Here, the analysis of the FACTS system's information flow contains two parts
which are similar to those discussed in Section 3.2.2. The analysis is done at two security
boundaries, one is at the physical boundary of the FACTS device and the other makes the
ControlledLine the security boundary since the ControlledLine is more or less an opened
line. The information flow is as shown in Figure 3.5, in Section 3.2.2.
The CFPS system is a nondeterministic system; noninference and nondeducible
are the two security models that can be used to do a static check for the information flow.
Two conclusions from Section 3.2.2 are listed here and will be analyzed next.
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Figure 4.3 FACTS system interaction

Conclusion 1: The UPFC device is noninference secure if taking the UPFC's
physical boundary as the security boundary
Conclusion 2: The UPFC device is nondeducible secure if taking the
ControlledLine as the security boundary
The analysis from the events point of view has been given in Section 3.2.2. Here,
in this step of the proposed process, the focus is on formal analysis using the SPA.
4.2.3.1 Security analysis of conclusion 1 using the noninference security
model. A formal model can be applied to analyze Conclusion 1. Table 4.5 shows

all the events that are allowed at the security boundary of UPFC devices.

Table 4.5 Events and allowed access
Implication

Events

Type

e1

High-level
subject
(Power
network) writes to high-level
object (UPFC device)
Low-level
subject
(ControlledLine) writes to highlevel object (UPFC device)
High-level subject (UPFC device)
writes to low-level object
(ControlledLine)

e3
e5

High-level
subject
(UPFC
device) reads from high-level
object(Power network)
Low-level
subject
(ControlledLine) reads from lowlevel object (local lines)
High-level
subject
(UPFC
device) reads from high-level
object (UPFC device)
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Although Table 4.5 lists only the allowed events, the formal requirements should
be able to capture both the illegal events and the invalid events. Equation (4) describes
the behavior of the FACTS system if taking the physical boundary of the UPFC as the
security boundary. The notion and value-passing SPA can be found in [15][16][27]. The
analysis below follows the procedure that is described in Section 2.2.

UPFC _ Deviceno _ time = ( Behavior1 | Object (0, PCL ) | Object (1, Pinit )) \ L

Behavior1 = M _ read (l , x ).(if (l == x )
then
r ( x, y ).Val (l , y ).Behavior1)
else
Behavior1 + M _ write(l , x ).(if (l >= x ).then
write(l , z ).W ( x, z ). Behavior1
else
if ( x == 1)then
write(l , z ).W (1, z ). Behavior1
elseBehavior1
Object ( x, y ) = R ( x, y ).Object (0, P, t ) + W ( x, y ).Object ( x, y )

(4)

Here M _ read (l , x ) / M _ write(l , x ) stand for events that subject of security level l
read/write to an object of security level x. y and z are the values (or states) of the object.
The above SPA describes the system behavior and possible executions.
Additional steps will be taken using the automatic checking tools to testify the
above SPA described system satisfies predicates defined as the noninference security
property, which is formalized in equation (1).
The FACTS system behavior can be shown as an access monitor for the UPFC
devices, which is depicted in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 UPFC device security boundary at devices physical boundary

4.2.3.2 Formalize the security analysis of conclusion 2 shown in last section.
Similarly, the information from Conclusion 2 is formalized. Table 4.6 shows all the
events that are allowed at the security boundary of ControlledLine.

Events

Type

e1

High-level

Table 4.6 Events and allowed access
Implication
subject

network) writes to
object (UPFC device)
e2
e4

(Power High-level subject (UPFC device)
reads from high-level object (Power
high-level
network)

High-level
subject
(Power
network) writes to low-level
object (ControlledLine)
Low-level
subject
(ControlledLine) writes to highlevel object (Power network)

High-level subject (Power network)
reads from high-level object (Power
network)
Low-level subject (ControlledLine)
reads from low-level object (local
lines)

The SPA to describe the CFPS which takes the security boundary at the
ControlledLine is very similar to the behavior of the CFPS with the security boundary at
UPFC device level. The SPA is shown as follows:
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UPFC _ ControlledLineno _ time = ( Behavior 2 | Object (0, PCL ) | Object (1, Pinit )) \ L

Behavior 2 = M _ read (l , x ).(if (l == x )then
r ( x, y ).Val (l , y ).Behavior 2)
elseBehavior 2
+ M _ write(l , x ).(if (l >= x )then
write(l , z ).W ( x, z ). Behavior 2
else
if ( x == 1)then
write(l , z ).W (1, z ). Behavior 2
elseBehavior 2
Object ( x, y ) = R ( x, y ).Object (0, P, t ) + W ( x, y ).Object ( x, y )

(5)

The system behaviors can be shown as Figure 4.5

Figure 4.5 UPFC device security boundary at ControlledLine

From Section 3.2.2, intuitively, the FACTS system, which has a security
boundary at the ControlledLine, satisfies the nondeducible security model. Here the SPA
defined in this section needs to check against the nondeducible security model as defined
in equation (2).
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With the above formal descriptions of both the FACTS behavior at the boundary
of ControlledLine and the nondeducible property, the automatic property checking tools
are ready to be applied to prove the security property of the FACTS system.

4.2.4 Beyond the Available Security Models. The security requirements are
easy to couple with other kinds of requirements such as nonfunctional requirements, e.g.
performance requirements (CPU burst can be encoded as '1' and CPU low usage can be
encoded as a '0', which can make a covert channel). Various kinds of nonfunctional
requirements can be coupled with the security requirements. This phenomenon occurs
frequently in the cyber-physical world. In this case a security model that contains pure
security considerations might only reflect one side of the problem. In order to add more
perspectives to the problem, the security models selected to analyze the information flow
are changed to include information about other requirements.
In the CFPS, the security requirement of information security has the potential of
coupling with the real-time requirement of the system. However, the security models that
are widely used do not always consider real-time or temporal behavior of the system. The
analysis in the previous section, which uses the current available security models, cannot
illustrate the possible security issues involving these temporal aspects. The system
behavior with timing is shown in Figure 4.6.
Observe Figure 4.6, if the attacker passively attaches power flow meters to the
low-level object (ControlledLine in the FACTS system) to log the line flow data, the
attacker could observe some significant changes of the line flow at certain time intervals
and infer the system update rate. For example, the following data gives a glimpse of a
line flow log. Here, the data are based on lab data which is aiming at testing the load
change and the FACTS device's response.
From this trace (shown in Table 4.7), it can be seen that the attacker gathers the
line flow information every 5ms. In other words, it has a sampling rate of 200Hz.
Observing the change rate of the line flow, the attacker can infer that after a significant
line flow change (at 190505ms), at least every 5ms, there is a change that causes the line
flow to drop. However, around every 100ms, the line flow will be balanced back to a
higher setting. Knowledgeable attackers could start a brief analysis of the power system
based on acquired information:
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Figure 4.6 Intuitive analysis of system behavior with temporal consideration

190505 ms, some contingency happens (location not yet known) that causes the
ControlledLine to have a flow change of around 20%
At least every 5ms, the line flow drops by 2%, which means there is something
withdrawing power flow from the ControlledLine at least every 5ms
At least every 100ms, the line flow is changed by 6%, which means there is some
other mechanism injecting power flow to the ControlledLine at least every 100ms
With the above observation and some guess work, the attacker obtains knowledge
about the system response time with the FACTS device on, which is around 5-100ms.
The above analysis regarding the system's behavior, with temporal constraints
taken into consideration, is based on some lab experience. A formal description needs to
be given in order to use a model checking tool to prove the correctness of the security of
information flow with timing considerations. Some literature [7][8][15] was introduced
ways of adapting time in the security model. The security models built in Section 4.2.3
are also modified to reflect the temporal constraints of the system and show whether the
coupling of nonfunctional requirements such as the real-time requirement, in this case,
have violated the security requirement or not.
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Table 4.7 Timestamped observation of ControlledLine
Time(ms) Line flow (pu)
150000

-0.34248

150005

-0.3425

150010

-0.34254

…

-0.34252

…

-0.34252
…

190505

-0.42768

190510

-0.42064

190515

-0.41765

190520

-0.41056
…

190610

-0.42059

190625

-0.41751

190630

-0.41038

190635

-0.40723
…

As in [8] and [15], time is represented by a tick to describe the system's time in a
discrete manner according to the global clock. (e.g. system = write. . .system), where
internal events will always follow write events and take a unit of time. In the current
approach, to include the temporal constraints in the SPA, the FACTS system's behavior is
chosen by extending the value passing SPA by one more value, the time interval. The line
flow change observation is based on the information of ControlledLine, so the security
boundary of the FACTS device was set to the ControlledLine. In the previous section,
system behavior observed at ControlledLIne was found to be nondeducible secure. With
temporal constraints, can a similar conclusion be reached?
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UPFC _ ControlledLinetime = ( Behavior 2 t | Object (0, Pinit , t ) | Object (1, Pinit , t )) \ L
Behavior 2 time = M _ read (l , x, t ).(if (l == x )then
R( x, y, t ).Val (l , y , t ). Behavior 2 time )
elseBehavior 2 time
+ M _ write(l , x, t ).(if (l >= x )then
Write(l , z, t ).W ( x, z, t ). Behavior 2 time
else
if ( x == 1)then
write(l , z, t ).W (1, z, t ). Behavior 2 time
elseBehavior 2 time
Object ( x, P, t ) = R ( x, P, t ).Object ( x, P, t ) + W ( x, P' , t ).Object ( x, P' , t )

(6)

Figure 4.7 shows the CFPS behavior with timing constraints. After the formal
expression of the system's execution sequence and the temporal constraints, the models
can be used to feed in the model checking tools. As seen from the informal analysis, the
conclusion has been drawn that the real-time constraints do affect the security properties.
In this case, the security requirement on information flow needs to be updated (as shown
in Table 4.8) with the real-time constraints to reflect the situation.

Figure 4.7 Behavior of FACTS considering timing constraints
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Table 4.8 System requirement for confidentiality
Security Requirements (Confidential): SR 1.1: The LTC's settings are confidential
SR 1.2: The dynamic control (DCtrl)'s settings are confidential
SR 1.3: The power electronics (PE)'s settings are confidential
SR 1.4: No weak operation point of system can be deduced
…
Updated: SR 1.*: System operation time can not be deduced

4.2.5 Apply the Automatic Checking Tools. Applying model checking tools to
the security models that are developed for the system is a significant step to prove the
correctness of the current security requirements and to find new security needs based on
the results of checking. In this thesis, the effort is mostly spent on preparing formal
descriptions for current system behavior and the security models that can be fed to the
selected checker or some other security property checking tools. However, if the security
properties can be formalized as to which kinds are suitable for any model checking tools,
those security properties can also be checked by available model checkers[28][29] other
than CoPS. The following section will discuss formalizing the security properties
identified in this section and feeding it to CoPS to get the result.
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5. RESULTS
One of the most significant points in the proposed information flow modeling
process for CPS is that the modeling process is not only aimed at describing the
information flow model but also at providing a strategy to check the available model so
that the result can be fed back to improve the security of a system at design time. The
security property modeled following that process needs to be checked when the models
are formalized. In this section, a persistent security property checking tool is applied to
do the automatic checking. The correctness of the selected security models used to define
the CPS is checked. The results from this formal checking can either prove the security of
current CPSs or be valuable feedback to be added to or modify the security requirements
of the system. As mentioned earlier, the SPA was chosen to formalize the security
property and CoPS is chosen as the automatic formal security property checking tool. The
security models described using SPA in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 were modified to be
compatible with the CoPS syntax in this section and then fed to CoPS to get the result.

5.1 USING SPA TO DEFINE THE CFPS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF
TIMING INFORMATION
Before considering any timing information in the CFPS, the system's behaviors
modeled in Section 4.2.3 using SPA are rewritten using syntax provided by CoPS.

5.1.1 Security Boundary at UPFC Device Level. According to Conclusion 1
the system satisfies the noninference security property [27] considering the UPFC
system's security boundary at the UPFC device level [36]. The system behavior is defined
using SPA in Section 4.2.3 as shown in equation (4). Here system behavior is further
modified to satisfy the syntax of CoPS as shown in Table 5.1 and fed into the CoPS to
check against the security property of BNDC.
//this simulation is for the security boundary at UPFC device level
//without considering any timing issues. here value 0 means initial
//value, 1 means it could be set to a new value
bi UPFC_NT
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(UPFC | LTC)\N
bi UPFC
(Behavior | HIL_h0 | HIL_l0)\L
bi Behavior
access_r_ll.(rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + rl1.'val_l1.Behavior) +
access_r_hh.(rh0.'val_h0.Behavior + rh1.'val_h1.Behavior) +
access_w_lh0.'wh0.Behavior +
access_w_lh1.'wh1.Behavior +
access_w_hl0.Behavior +
access_w_hl1.Behavior +
access_w_hh0.'wh0.Behavior +
access_w_hh1.'wh1.Behavior
bi HIL_l0
'rl0.HIL_l0 + wl0.HIL_l0 + wl1.HIL_l1
bi HIL_l1
'rl1.HIL_l1 + wl0.HIL_l0 + wl1.HIL_l1
bi HIL_h0
'rh0.HIL_h0 + wh0.HIL_h0 + wh1.HIL_h1
bi HIL_h1
'rh1.HIL_h1 + wh0.HIL_h0 + wh1.HIL_h1
bi LTC
a_r_hh.'access_r_hh.(val_h0.'put_h0.LTC + val_h1.'put_h1.LTC ) +
a_w_hh0.'access_w_hh0.LTC +
a_w_hh1.'access_w_hh1.LTC
basi L
rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1
wh0 wh1 wl0 wl1
basi N
val_h0 val_h1
val_l0 val_l1
access_r_hh access_r_hl access_r_lh access_r_ll
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access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1
access_w_lh0 access_w_lh1 access_w_ll0 access_w_ll1
acth
a_r_hh a_r_hl
a_w_hh0 a_w_hh1 a_w_hl0 a_w_hl1
put_h0 put_h1
val_h0 val_h1
rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh access_r_hl
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1

5.1.2 Security Boundary at the ControlledLine Level. The ControlledLine
is easier to attack compared to the UPFC device at the device boundary due to the
physical security protection of the system. The UPFC system's security boundary is
extended to the ControlledLine. Section 3.2.2 shows the UPFC system, taking the
security boundary at the ControlledLine, and satisfying the nondeducible security
property. The system's behaviors are described using SPA in Section 4.2.3 as shown in
equation (5).
The above model has been converted into codes that are compatible with CoPS
syntax as shown in Table 5.2. Those codes will be checked against the BNDC property. If
this model satis_es the BNDC property, that means, the UPFC system can be composed
with any other system that also satis_es BNDC to build a larger system.
//this simulation is for the security boundary at ControlledLine level
//without considering any timing issues
//here value 0 means initial value, 1 means it could be set
//to a new value
bi CL_NT
(CL | LTC)\N
//here consider the LTC objects and the internal events brought by LTC
bi CL
(Behavior | HIL_h0 | HIL_l0)\L
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bi Behavior
access_r_ll.(rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + rl1.'val_l1.Behavior) +
access_r_hh.(rh0.'val_h0.Behavior + rh1.'val_h1.Behavior) +
access_w_lh0.'wh0.Behavior +
access_w_lh1.'wh1.Behavior +
access_w_hl0.Behavior +
access_w_hl1.Behavior +
access_w_hh0.'wh0.Behavior +
access_w_hh1.'wh1.Behavior
bi HIL_l0
'rl0.HIL_l0 + wl0.HIL_l0 + wl1.HIL_l1
bi HIL_l1
'rl1.HIL_l1 + wl0.HIL_l0 + wl1.HIL_l1
bi HIL_h0
'rh0.HIL_h0 + wh0.HIL_h0 + wh1.HIL_h1
bi HIL_h1
'rh1.HIL_h1 + wh0.HIL_h0 + wh1.HIL_h1
bi LTC
a_r_hh.'access_r_hh.(val_h0.'put_h0.LTC +
val_h1.'put_h1.LTC ) +
a_w_hh0.'access_w_hh0.LTC +
a_w_hh1.'access_w_hh1.LTC
basi L
rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1
wh0 wh1 wl0 wl1
basi N
val_h0 val_h1
val_l0 val_l1
access_r_hh access_r_hl access_r_lh access_r_ll
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1
access_w_lh0 access_w_lh1 access_w_ll0 access_w_ll1
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acth
a_r_hh
a_w_hh0 a_w_hh1 a_w_hl0 a_w_hl1
put_h0 put_h1
val_h0 val_h1
rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1

5.2 USING SPA TO DEFINE THE CFPS WITH CONSIDERATION OF TIMING
INFORMATION
Various researchers have worked on theoretical information flow property
analysis for several years. However, the uniqueness of this work is in using a tangible
example, the CFPS system, to illustrate the security properties that are developed from
the theory. Furthermore, this work extends the model to consider the physical nature of
the system. The physical nature of the system cannot be ignored since that is how the
system works and some of the inherited physical nature will affect the cyber system in a
CPS.
Currently, to the best of the author's knowledge, there is little literature [15] that
describes a system's information property together with timing constraints. In order to
include timing in the model, a special operation called "tick" is used. "Tick" does nothing
but act as an atomic operation and represent the clock of the whole system moving by one
unit of time.
Figure 5.1 lists the timing constraints of the CFPS system and also the
corresponding number of ticks that had been used in the checking. The actual frequency
ratio between the objects is 1000:330:1, however, in the model a reduced number of ticks
is used to reduce the complexity of model checking. The pattern of the frequencies is kept
close to this ratio, but is not exact.
After defining "tick" to represent the time lapse of the system, the models which
use SPA can be modified. The UPFC system with both the security boundary at device
level and the ControlledLine level have all been analyzed by adding the timing
constraints as adding some "tick" after corresponding activities. The behavior of the
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UPFC system is described in Table 5.3 to demonstrate the model of UPFC with the
security boundary at the UPFC device. Another model of the UPFC system with the
boundary at ControlledLine can be found as following.

Figure 5.1 CFPS timing constraints and corresponding model to interpret the elapse of
time

A SPA model of the UPFC system, which has the security boundary at the UPFC
device, has the following timing constraints:
//this simulation is for the security boundary at UPFC device level
//considering any timing issues
//here value 0 means initial value, 1 means it could be set
//to a new value
bi UPFC_NT
(UPFC | LTC)\N
bi UPFC
(Behavior | HIL_h0 | HIL_l0)\L
bi Behavior
access_r_ll.(rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + rl1.'val_l1.Behavior) +
access_r_hh.(rh0.'val_h0.Behavior + rh1.'val_h1.Behavior) +
access_w_lh0.'wh0.tick.tick.tick.Behavior +
access_w_lh1.'wh1.tick.tick.tick.Behavior +
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access_w_hl0.tick.tick.Behavior +
access_w_hl1.tick.tick.Behavior +
access_w_hh0.'wh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.Behavior +
access_w_hh1.'wh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.Behavior
bi HIL_l0
'rl0.HIL_l0 + wl0.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l0 + wl1.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l1
bi HIL_l1
'rl1.HIL_l1 + wl0.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l0 + wl1.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l1
bi HIL_h0
'rh0.HIL_h0 + wh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h0
+ wh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h1
bi HIL_h1
'rh1.HIL_h1 + wh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h0
+ wh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h1
bi LTC
a_r_hh.'access_r_hh.(val_h0.'put_h0.LTC + val_h1.'put_h1.LTC ) +
a_w_hh0.'access_w_hh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.LTC +
a_w_hh1.'access_w_hh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.LTC
basi L
rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1
wh0 wh1 wl0 wl1
tick
basi N
val_h0 val_h1
val_l0 val_l1
access_r_hh access_r_hl access_r_lh access_r_ll
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1
access_w_lh0 access_w_lh1 access_w_ll0 access_w_ll1
acth
a_r_hh a_r_hl
a_w_hh0 a_w_hh1 a_w_hl0 a_w_hl1

47
put_h0 put_h1
val_h0 val_h1
rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh access_r_hl
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1
SPA model of UPFC system, which has the security boundary at the
ControlledLine, considering timing constraints:

//this simulation is for the security boundary at ControlledLine level
//without considering any timing issues
//here value 0 means initial value, 1 means it could be set
//to a new value
bi CL_NT
(CL | LTC)\N
bi CL
(Behavior | HIL_h0 | HIL_l0)\L
bi Behavior
access_r_ll.(rl0.'val_l0.Behavior + rl1.'val_l1.Behavior) +
access_r_hh.(rh0.'val_h0.Behavior + rh1.'val_h1.Behavior) +
access_w_lh0.'wh0.tick.tick.tick.Behavior +
access_w_lh1.'wh1.tick.tick.tick.Behavior +
access_w_hl0.tick.Behavior +
access_w_hl1.tick.Behavior +
access_w_hh0.'wh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.Behavior +
access_w_hh1.'wh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.Behavior
bi HIL_l0
'rl0.HIL_l0 + wl0.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l0 + wl1.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l1
bi HIL_l1
'rl1.HIL_l1 + wl0.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l0 + wl1.tick.tick.tick.HIL_l1
bi HIL_h0
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'rh0.HIL_h0 + wh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h0
+ wh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h1
bi HIL_h1
'rh1.HIL_h1 + wh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h0
+ wh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.HIL_h1
bi LTC
a_r_hh.'access_r_hh.(val_h0.'put_h0.LTC +
val_h1.'put_h1.LTC ) +
a_w_hh0.'access_w_hh0.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.LTC +
a_w_hh1.'access_w_hh1.tick.tick.tick.tick.tick.LTC
basi L
rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1
wh0 wh1 wl0 wl1
tick
basi N
val_h0 val_h1
val_l0 val_l1
access_r_hh access_r_hl access_r_lh access_r_ll
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1
access_w_lh0 access_w_lh1 access_w_ll0 access_w_ll1
acth
a_r_hh
a_w_hh0 a_w_hh1 a_w_hl0 a_w_hl1
put_h0 put_h1
val_h0 val_h1
rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh
access_w_hh0 access_w_hh1 access_w_hl0 access_w_hl1
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5.3

RESULTS FROM
PROPERTY (COPS)

THE

CHECKER

OF

PERSISTENT

SECURITY

System behaviors are described in SPA and fed into CoPS to check against the
security property of BNDC. The results are in Table 5.1. These results include the UPFC
system which has the security boundary at the device level or at the ControlledLine.

Table 5.1 Results of applied CoPS against UPFC models described by SPA
System
Satisfy # of Generated
Time
to Composable
BNDC states Graph

check

the

property (s)
UPFC Device (No time Yes

36

constraints)
36

constraints)
Device

time constraints)

Yes

V: 34

0.18

Yes

0.17

No

0.14

No

E: 52
(With No
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time constraints)
ControlledLine

0.18

E: 52

ControlledLine (No time Yes
UPFC

V: 34

V: 47
E: 65

(With No
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V: 47
E: 65

From the results listed in Table 5.1, conclusions can be drawn that for the security
properties of UPFC system, without considering the timing constraints, whether the
security boundary stops at the UPFC device or the ControlledLine, the UPFC system
satisfies BNDC. This is a stricter result than those stated in Section 3.2.2, since Section
3.2.2 only claims the UPFC system with the security boundary at UPFC device level
satisfies the noninference security property and with the security boundary at
ControlledLine, satisfies nondeducible security property. However, as stated in [12],
some systems that satisfy the nondeducible security property are not composable. This
affects further consideration of the composed UPFC system with other systems to
preserve security.
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The current result is favorable since the UPFC system with the security boundary
at ControlledLine not only satisfies the property of nondeducible but also satisfies the
BNDC, which is a composable security property. The system satisfies the BNDC because
the internal events brought by LTC have been taken into consideration. These internal
events lead to e4 . Being more specific, the event system described in 3.2.2, shown in
Figure 3.5, has been modified to allow e4 to be a legal trace in the system by introducing
the internal event τ . The system traces became {{}, .e4, e1e4, e2e4, e1e2e4, …}. This
system satisfies the BNDC since from the observation point of view the observed result is
compatible with any high-level input even when composed with other systems [9].
Besides considering the composability in a CPS, timing constraints are also significant
aspects. The UPFC system is also modeled in SPA with time taken into consideration.
Table 5.1 provides those results that fed the SPA models to CoPS with timing.
Unfortunately, UPFC system does not satisfy the security property of BNDC whether
having the security boundary stop at the UPFC device or the ControlledLine. Besides not
satisfying BNDC, the UPFC system with timing constraints is not composable.
The UPFC system with timing does not satisfy the BNDC security property.
Intuitively, the divergence from BNDC by adding timing information to the UPFC
system points out it is highly possible that timing constraints can be deduced or inferred
by the observer since time lapse is a common event, which cannot be avoided in physical
systems. It is something both trusted security domains and others can observe. An
experiment is conducted to prove it is the pattern of timing constraints that introduces
inference into the UPFC system. In this experiment, instead of classifying "tick" as a lowlevel event (naturally, it is a low-level event that can be observed by any level of security
domain as long as a global clock exists), "tick" is classified as high-level event, and the
CoPS tools has been rerun to check against the security property of BNDC. This
experiment proves the initial guess that timing constraints introduce the possibility of
inferences. One more item of security requirements need to be added to the system to
demonstrate the need of removing the timing inference in the system. One possible
solution to this problem is to introduce obfuscation into the system and mask the
frequency pattern. Further research work needs to be conducted.
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BNDC is important as CPSs are usually more or less composed of various
physical and cyber systems. This fact shows the importance of composability to the
security property, where composability means one or more composable secured systems.
When composed together, their security properties will be preserved. In this way, no
extra effort needs to be spent to prove the security of the system-of-system if every
subsystem is secure and satisfies composable security properties.
Furthermore, an approach of proving the security of the system-of-system is
implied here. Formally proving that the subsystems satisfy some composable security
properties, such as BNDC, then directly composing these systems with other systems that
satisfy composable security properties, results in a system-of-system that should satisfy
the security property. To better illustrate this process, Figure 5.2 shows the process of
using formal checking tools to check the security property and compose the systems into
systems-of-systems.

2

9

1

#
77

Figure 5.2 Process of using formal checking tool to prove the security property and
compose systems which satisfy composable security properties into system-of-system
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6. CONCLUSION
This thesis pointed out the importance of information flow security in a CPS,
provided a process to model the information flow in a CPS, and suggested formalizing
the system and using automatic checking tools to prove security properties.

6.1 CPS'S INFORMATION FLOW NEED TO BE CONSIDERED
This thesis analyzed the information flow in the CFPS. Under Assumptions 1, 2
and 3 described in Section 3.1, the UPFC local setting is confidential by considering the
interface security models. However, the settings can still be deduced by mathematical
computation with enough measurements taken from the ControlledLine(s), at the cyberphysical boundary. Meanwhile, UPFC control operations such as the Dynamic Control
operation and Long Term Control operation cannot be inferred from observing the lowlevel behavior of CFPS. This is a promising result that shows considering the information
flow of the CFPS, the confidentiality of the UPFC data setting and the control operations
are not broken by inference or deducing information from information flow. This kind of
self-obfuscation, in which the internal events of a system can obfuscate the system's
behavior so that the external observer will not be able to deduce information from the
system, not only appears in the power system but also in some other CPS such as oil
pipeline systems, air traffic control systems and transportation systems. However, careful
analysis is still needed at the cyber-physical boundaries since the cyber-physical
interactions tend to leak the information to the outside world. This motivates a process or
the modeling of the information flow of CPS.

6.2 A PROCESS TO MODEL INFORMATION FLOW IN CYBER-PHYSICAL
SYSTEM IS POSSIBLE
The proposed process is suitable for a large system, which possibly has some
other functional or non-functional requirements that mix with the security requirement.
The current work leads to the conclusions and artifacts listed in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1 Conclusions and artifacts from the process of modeling information flow in
Cyber-Physical System
Step 1: Elicit Information flow security requirements from misuse case

Conclusion: It's possible and effective to use the misuse case to identify security
requirements together with the system information flow model. System information flow
security requirements can be elicited in this way.

Artifacts:
(1) Misuse case
(2) System information diagram
(3) Security requirement (CIA)
(4) Information ow security requirements

Step 2: Identify functional or nonfunctional requirements related to the security
requirements
Conclusion: A strategy can be used to search the functional and nonfunctional
requirements to find the possible requirement that couples with the system information
flow security requirements.

Artifacts:
(1) Nonfunctional requirements list (temporal requirements) couple with the information
flow security requirements

Step 3: Apply available security models and formal evaluation
Conclusion: Available security properties and models that are widely used in
the defense community can be used to formalize a large system as long as it
can be broken into smaller subsystems which are composable

Artifacts:
(1) Formal description of the system behavior using value passing SPA
(2) Formal description of the security models (noninference and nondeducible) using
value passing SPA

Step 4: Extend security model according to the information analysis and formal
evaluation
Conclusion: Considering the system's temporal constraints, the security models used in
step 3 have been modified to include the timing information of the system behavior
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Table 6.1 Conclusions and artifacts from the process of modeling information flow in
Cyber-Physical System (cont.)
Artifacts:
(1) Formal description of the system behavior and temporal constraints using value
passing SPA

step 5: Apply automatic tools to do the formal checking
Conclusion: System behavior described in step 3 and 4 will be formalized using SPA and
fed to the checking tool - CoPS, results will be fed back to revise the security
requirements

Artifacts:
(1) Formal checking results
Furthermore, the results also show that formal checking tools, such as CoPS, are
useful and efficient to prove the correctness of the security properties based on the
available security requirements. If the correctness of a security property is proven by the
tools, further security policies can be introduced accordingly. However, even if the
security property is not validated by a formal checking tool, the results and checking
process can uncover some potential security breach points and further aid the design of
the system to provide better security.

6.3 FUTURE WORK
This thesis offers a concrete example of using the proposed process to model the
Cyber-Physical System. More Cyber-Physical Systems need to be considered and various
functional and non-functional requirements that coupling with the security requirements
need to be identified and analyzed to further prove the wide application of this process.
After modeling the information flow security of the Cyber-Physical Systems, possible
solution as obfuscating the system need to be considered to secure the system. More work
need to be done to prevent the system information flows through the cyber-physical
boundaries.
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